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R.C.B. Risk*

Lawyers, Courts, and the
Rise of the Regulatory State

I. Introduction
In 1883, when Dalhousie Law School was created, lawyers in
England, the United States, and Canada stood at the edge of a
watershed. Massive changes in the law began during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - changes in doctrine,
institutions, practice, and ways of thinking. I cannot imagine how I
might describe these changes in one short paper, even if I
understood them all. Instead, I have chosen to talk about one large
strand, regulation, because it is an important feature of law in the
twentieth century and because it offers an opportunity to consider
some distinctive characteristics of our Canadian legal experience.
My primary interest is the thinking of the common law lawyers judges, practioners, and academics - and especially their thinking
about the ideal form of their legal system and about regulation, in
particular the relation between courts and agencies and the
constitutional legitimacy of regulatory power. My topic is massive,
and I can hope only to present some suggestions and an agenda for
future work.
II. The Late Nineteenth Century
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, common law
lawyers shared a set of ideals for law. The basic elements of these
ideals were that the law should protect individual autonomy by
setting generous boundaries within which each individual would be
free from interference from other individuals and from the state.
These boundaries were to be established by comprehensive general
rules, largely common law rules which would govern all individuals
and the state both prospectively and indifferently and which would
be applied by courts in an objective and apolitical way. These ideals
were primarily, but not entirely, a product of late nineteenth century
liberalism. The nature of the other influences is debatable, but the
most important possibilities are lawyers' interests (for example, a
need to establish a coherent legal system after the abolition of the
*Professor of Law, University of Toronto.
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forms of action), the appeal of the scientific method, and a desire to
establish a domain for their own knowledge and power. Dicey's
famous statement of the rule of law expressed and was shaped by
these ideals. Mingled with them and with the rule of law was a gulf
between law and politics. This gulf appeared in many different
forms and contexts, and especially in the areas of jurisprudence and
legal education, and in conceptions of doctrine and the judicial
process. It had existed for several centuries at least, but it had
become especially deep and pervasive in the late nineteenth century.
The ideals were not, of course, exclusive, and did not take the
same form for all lawyers. In the United States, a legal mandarinate,
comprised primarily of academics, developed them in their purest
form and included a distinctive emphasis on conceptual reasoning,
an emphasis which was not present in England. The situation in
Canada is harder to trace, as lawyers there did remarkably little
recorded speculating. My impression is that the ideals were
imported faithfully from England; nevertheless, we need to do much
more work if we are to understand the Canadian lawyers' minds.
We need especially to understand the role of the distinctive elements
of our political traditions, especially our conservative tradition and
its relation to these ideals.
Whatever form the ideals took, they were never fully realized.
Yet, they must have seemed natural and realistic, considering the
prevailing political and economic beliefs and the legal doctrine and
institutions. For the common law lawyers, law was primarily
common law, administered by the courts, and statutes were
considered to be isolated and interstitial modifications, made to
meet particular needs. '
IL1. Regulation: 1900 to 1920
Canada never had the liberal state in the middle of the nineteenth
century that England had and which some thinkers thought it should
1. These ideals, their causes, and their effects have not yet been thoroughly
described. For suggestive fragments, see Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of
Contract(1979), Pt. 2; Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (1979), Ch.
7; Gordon, Review, 94 Harvard L.R. 903; Kennedy, Towards an Historical

Understanding (1980), 3 Research in Law and Sociology; Mensch, "The History
of Mainstream Legal Thought", in Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique (1982) 18; and Sugarman, The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey,
Liberalism, and Legal Science (1983), 46 Modern L.R. 102. In Canada, the ideals
were stated in Bourinot, Canadian Studies in Comparative Politics (1980),
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 3.
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have. The state encouraged the creation of the nation and its
economic expansion primarily by creating and financing railways,
creating a tariff barrier, and encouraging immigration. However,
this encouragement usually did not take the form of regulation. The
first major period for the creation of our regulatory state was from
1900 to 1920, although much of what was done was a continuation
of steps taken in the nineteenth century. 2 Standards were imposed
for agricultural products, especially dairy products, and price and
service requirements were imposed on public utilities, including the
railroads. Broad and vague limits were imposed on restraint of trade
and were expanded in the short-lived Combines and Fair Prices Act
of 1919. Minimum requirements were established for conditions of
work and for wages, and limits on strikes and the right to the
investigation of disputes were imposed by the Industrial Disputes
Investigation Act of 1906. Control over land use expanded with the
development of zoning bylaws, and the beginnings of the
administrative regulation of developments and licence requirements
were imposed for a variety of professions and occupations. In short,
although regulation was neither as extensive nor as intensive as it
became later, some important institutions and patterns had been
established. The legal world had begun to change and the ideals of
the nineteenth century were threatened.
For my purposes, the most significant step in the process of
regulation was the creation of the Board of Railway Commissioners
in 1902, because it established the dominant model for our
regulatory agencies and presented the issue of constitutional
legitimacy. 3 Requirements governing the construction and operation of the railways, as well as rates, had begun in the
mid-nineteenth century, although they were far from being
extensive or detailed, and in 1888 the administration of these
requirements was assigned to a committee of the cabinet, namely,
the Railway Committee of the Privy Council.

2. General accounts of the growth of regulation during this period can be found in
Corry, The Growth of Government Activities Since Confederation (1939);
Baggaley, The Emergence of the Regulatory State in Canada (1981); Technical

Report 15 of the Economic Council of Canada; Priest and Wohl, "The Growth of
Federal and Provincial Regulation of Economic Activity, 1867-1978", in
Stanbury, ed., Government Regulation -Scope,

Growth, Process ( 1980); and The

Growth of Government Activities in Canada, 1914-1921 [1940], Can. Hist. Assoc.
Rep. 63.
3. The Railway Act, 1903, 1903 Stat. Can., c. 58, s. 8.
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In 1898, the government appointed a young and unknown
academic, Simon J. McLean, to investigate railway rates and
railway commissions. He had been born in the United States and
received his early education in Canada. His record at university
would make a modern graduate student weep: he obtained a B.A. in
1894 and an LL.B. in 1895 (both from the University of Toronto),
an M.A. from Columbia University in 1896, and a Ph.D. from the
University of Chicago in 1897. Most of his proposals, made in
reports in 1899 and 1902, were accepted by the government. 4 He
concluded that regulation was necessary and that it should be carried
out by a commission. In designing the commission, he looked to the
experience in England and in the United States, although in the end
his proposals included much of his own thinking and took into
account the Canadian past. He rejected continuing the cabinet
committee because it combined "administrative" !nd "political"
functions. He said, "the regulation is essentially an administrative
function; an intermingling of this with political duties leads to lack
of harmony and efficiency." He did not define these functions and
the distinction between them, although he stressed that experience,
technical knowledge, and security of tenure were needed for the
performance of administrative functions. This analysis was
probably derived from thinking which was predominant in the
United States, and especially from that of one scholar, Frank
Goodnow, who was one of the fathers of American political science
and a professor at Columbia when McLean was a graduate student
5
there.
The last major issue that McLean considered was control of the
commission. He opposed giving the courts any control at all,
because "in matters of railway regulation questions of policy are
involved, but of these the courts have for the most part been
oblivious." The government disagreed and a right of appeal to the
Supreme Court on questions of law and jurisdiction was given. At
the end of his second report, McLean proposed another form of
4. McLean, Reports Upon Railway Commissions, Railway Rate Grievances, and
Regulative Legislation (Parliament of Canada, 1902), Sessional Paper 20a.
5. Goodnow presented the distinction between political and administrative
functions in Politics and Administration, published in 1900. Dates cause a

problem, because McLean's first report is dated 1899 and none of Goodnow's
earlier writings suggests the distinction in any sustained way. However, the
parallels in the thinking make the influence seem likely. The problem is to
determine its path, not its existence. The writings of both forbid one from

wondering whether McLean influenced Goodnow.
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control which the government did accept, namely, review by the
cabinet. His reason was simply that "ministerial responsibility to
Parliament must be recognized." The result was a distinctive
institution which combined the "independent" regulatory agency
and ultimate direct political control. Afterwards, many more
agencies were created, and took a surprisingly wide variety of
forms, but McLean's commission and his accommodation of
independence and control slowly came to be our dominant model.
This model presents an issue of constitutional legitimacy, that is,
the legitimacy of giving powers to officials who are neither elected
nor judges. This issue was not perceived or discussed in any
substantial way in McLean's reports, 6 but several justifications are
implicit. The first and most obvious one is the power of the cabinet
to review. The government is ultimately responsible both for the
decisions that it reviews and, with some unrealistic assumptions
about tacit approval, for the decisions it does not review. The
second justification is derived from the distinction between political
and administrative functions and from the legitimacy given by
expertise and experience. Ultimately, these two justifications are
inconsistent because they are based on different conceptions of the
functions being performed, one being political and the other
apolitical. Both have appeared and reappeared in our discussions of
regulation during the past eighty years.
IV. The Courts: 1900 to 1930
The doctrine for judicial review of the exercise of regulatory power
is the general doctrine of administrative law. It was, until the advent
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, determined by the British
North America Act and by basic constitutional principles inherited
from Britain. The two major principles were that the legislature was
the supreme lawmaker and that the limits of authority conferred by

6. Most of the discussion that did occur was about municipal government; see, for
example, Rutherford, ed., Saving the Canadian City (1974): Rutherford,
Tomorrow's Metropolis: The Urban Reform Movement in Canada, 1880-1920
[1971], Can. Hist. Assoc. Hist. Papers 203; and Weaver, " 'Tomorrows'
Metropolis' Revisted: A Critical Assessment of Urban Reform in Canada,
1890-1920", in Stelter and Artibise, eds., The Canadian City (1979) 393. See also
Stewart, The Employment Service of Canada (1919), 27 Queens Quar. 37; Clark,
The Board of Commerce (1920), 28 Queens Quar. 304; McFall, Regulation of
Business in Canada (1922), 37 Pol. Sci. Quar. 177; and Dawson, The Principleof
Official Independance (1922), Ch. 4.
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the legislature were to be determined by the courts. In the late
nineteenth century, when my story begins and when this function of
the courts began to be an important part of their work, these
principles were shaped by the general ideals of law and the
distinction between law and politics: the ideal for the allocation of
functions was that legislatures should make choices about values.
The courts should not make these choices; instead, they should
determine the limits of authority in an objective and apolitical way,
without considering the merits or values of the legislation or the
regulatory action (unless a right of appeal was given by statute).
In the early twentieth century, legislative supremacy was clearly
demonstrated and loudly proclaimed in several judgments in which
statutes modified or terminated property rights and contracts.
Proposals were made for constitutional amendments, but most of
the fuss was created by the use of the constitutional arguments for
transparently political purposes, and were forgotten when the
political needs passed. 7 The delegation of power by legislatures to
regulatory agencies was permitted without significant restriction, 8
and section 96 of the British North America Act, whatever purposes
it was intended to serve, was not yet a significant limitation on the
creation of agencies by the provinces.
Legislative supremacy stood in contrast to the constitutional
protections established in the United States for property and
contracts, and for the separation of powers. These differences made
the forms of reasoning obviously and fundamentally different, but
the differences in the effective extent of the limitations on
legislative choice are more problematic. In general, the differences
were probably greater early in the twentieth century than they were
later, when courts in the United States restricted the protections of
contracts and property. However, respect for the separation of
powers has continued to be much greater in the United States than in
Canada.

7. Florence Mining v. Cobalt Lake Mining (1909), 18 OLR 275, and Smith v.
London (1909), 20 OLR 133. See Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism:
Ontario'sRelations with the FederalGovernment, 1867-1942 (1981), Chs. 3 and
4; Nelles and Armstrong, "Private Property in Peril: Ontario Businessmen and the
Federal System, 1898-1911", in Porter and Cuff, eds., Enterprise and National
Development (1973) 20; MacPhail, Andrew, Confiscatory Legislation (1911), 10
Univ. Mag. 192; and Darby, Arthur E. The Individual and the State (1918), Univ.
Mag. 488.
8. Hodge v. The Queen (1893), 9 AC 117 (PC); Re Gray (1918), 57 SCR 150.
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The courts considered only a few cases involving challenges to
regulatory power. Their decisions suggest two basic conclusions.
First, the doctrine was simple. Most of the judgments were put in
terms of interpretation - for example, did the statute grant a given
agency the power to do what it did? All of the wonderful
complexities that now plague courts, practitioners, academics, and
students lay ahead, decades away. One example is the case of
remedies: virtually all of the review was done through appeals, and
the mysteries of the prerogative writs had not yet been unveiled.
The second conclusion about the decisions of the courts concerns
their attitudes toward regulatory powers. Of course, these attitudes
are difficult to determine and may depend upon some assumptions
about the proper allocation of functions. However, my impression is
that the courts did not demonstrate any general hostility. I offer two
examples to support this claim. The first is Ingersoll Telephone
Company v. Bell Telephone Company, in which the Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal from a decision of the Railway Commissioners
regarding the compensation to be paid by local telephone companies
for use of Bell Telephone's long distance lines. 9 Anglin J. said that
"it was the purpose of Parliament to entrust to the Board the widest
discretion, not merely as to the amount of the compensation to be
directed, but also as to the elements which should be taken into
account in fixing it." The second example is Re Consolidated
Telephone Company and the Townships of Caledon and Erin, in
which the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the
telephone company from the refusal of the Ontario Railway and
Municipal Board to approve the sale of its system to two
townships. 10 Meredith C.J.O. said, "the Board does not, in my

9. Ingersoll Telephone v. Bell Telephone (1916), 53 SCR 583.
10. Re Consolidated Telephone and Townships of Caledon and Erin (1920), 48
OLR 140 (App. Div.). Some other representative cases from the Ontario courts and
the Supreme Court are Toronto Suburban Railway v. Toronto Junction [1908]
DWR 108; Re PortArthur Street Railway (1909), 18 OLR 376 (CA); Re Village of
Brussels and McKillop Municipal Telephone System (1912), 26 OLR 29 (CA); Re
Toronto and Toronto Railway (1912), 26 OLR 225 (CA); Waterloo v. Berlin
(1912), 28 OLR 207 (App. Div.); Re Ottawa and Provincial Board of Health
(1914), 33 OLR 1: Toronto Suburban Railway v. Toronto [1913] 29 OLR 105
(App. Div.), [1915] AC 590 (PC); Re Toronto Railway and Toronto (1918), 44
OLR 381 (App. Div.), rev'd [ 1920] AC 446 (PC): Re Price Brothers and Board of
Commerce of Canada (1920), 60 SCR 265: Wilson and Esquimalt and Nanaimo
Railway [1922] 1 AC 202; Re Security Export and Hetherington [1923] SCR 539;
Lethbridge v. Canadian Western NaturalGas, Light, Heat and Power [ 1923] SCR
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opinion,

act judicially,

but acts as

the designate

of the

Legislature. . .. the board would have to consider the matters

which the Legislature itself would have considered if application
had been made to it for a special Act;. . .the discretion of the Board
is absolute, subject only to review by the Lieutenant-Governor in
Council."
These attitudes are difficult to explain because the general ideals
about law that were shared by lawyers in the late nineteenth century
would have suggested much less willingness to accept regulation
and discretion on the part of government. I can suggest two
explanations. The first is the influence of general Canadian political
attitudes, particularly the conservative element, or "Tory touch" an organic conception of society and a willingness to undertake and
accept extensive governing. Put in this simple form, this
explanation is itself an assertion that needs explanation, and the
Tory touch and the attempts to explain it are a battleground for
Canadian historians. In the recent battles, it seems to have been
bloodied or unmasked, or to have retreated into mist at the edge of
the field.' 1
The second explanation is derived from attitudes toward the
content and purpose of the regulation. It begins with the hypothesis
that the regulation was approved or accepted by business interests,
and that its purposes were to manage or control the market for their
benefit or to compromise with other interests, especially labour. It
supported, rather than threatened, the established economic order
and patterns of power. Attitudes and strategies toward regulation
have been extensively debated in the United States, but much more
analysis and research is required in Canada. The work done so far in

652; Sandwich East v. Union Natural Gas [1924] 56 OLR 399; Re General
Accident Insurance (1926), 58 OLR 470 (App. Div.); and Northwestern Utilities v.
Edmonton [1929] SCR 186.
11. For a sampling of the historical literature, see Grant, Lament for a Nation: The
Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (1965); Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics
(1968), Ch. 1; Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and
Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario (1974); Traves, The State and Enterprise:
Canadian Manufacturers and the Federal Government, 1917-1931 (1979); Aitken,

"Defensive

Expansion; The State and Economic Growth in Canada",

in

Easterbrook and Aitken, eds., Approaches to Canadian Economic History (1967);

Brady, "The State and Economic Life", in Brown, ed., Canada (1950); Craven
and Traves, The Class Politics of the National Policy, 1872-1933 (1979), 14 J.
Can. Stud. 14; and Dewar, Toryism and Public Ownership in Canada: A Comment
(1983), 14 Can. Hist. Rev. 404.
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this country suggests that this hypothesis is reasonable, although our
attitudes toward the state forbid exclusive reliance on the American
analysis. This explanation also requires that the judges shared the
attitudes of the legislatures and the business interests, which is
another reasonable possibility and another topic for research.
Ultimately, these two explanations can be merged, or the second
can swallow the first and the Tory touch attitudes toward regulation
12
can be perceived as the attitudes of business interests.
A comparison of the attitudes of the Canadian courts with those
of the courts in England and the United States would be an
interesting and useful test for these and any other explanations of the
attitudes of the courts toward regulatory powers. However, such
comparisons would be complicated by the different legislative
structures involved and would ultimately depend upon general
impressions.
Whatever the explanations may be, the attitudes of the courts had
to be accommodated with the nineteenth century ideals. This
provides an example of a general theme, namely, the relation
between these ideals and the Canadian political tradition, which is a
promising perspective for the study of Canadian legal history. My
impression is that one way the lawyers made the accommodation
was to ignore any inconsistency; such are the benefits of not
speculating. In addition, the lawyers may have been helped by the
prevailing distinction between law and politics. The law was the
common law and its values, and politics was legislation - and
choice and compromise. This distinction may also explain a
conspicuous lack of discussion of legislation and regulation in the
professional journals. Whenever the lawyers were self-consciously
thinking about the law and their functions, they may have perceived
their domain as the common law and private practice. Their
dominant response to the advent of regulation seems to have been to
insulate their thinking from its implications.
V. The 1930s
During the 1920s, little new regulation appeared, other than
securities regulation, which was established in most provinces. By
contrast, the 1930s saw massive changes in regulation, both in

12. For a review of this literature, see McGraw, Regulation in America: A Review
Article (1975), 49 Bus. Hist. Rev. 159.
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degree and in kind. These changes were part of a ferment which
made it an exciting decade - perhaps the most exciting single
decade in Canadian legal history. 13 The New Deal and its
constitutional fate are familiar to us, at least in their general
outlines, but much more regulation was imposed during this period
and much of it remains in place today. Diversity among the
provinces was great, and makes generalizations both necessary and
precarious. Nevertheless, imagine the impact on the economy and
on the minds of lawyers that these changes had, most of which
appeared between 1932 and 1935. Modest additions were made to
the inventory of licensing and of standards for agricultural products.
In agriculture, the regulation of prices and output began with the
farm products marketing acts, which encountered large constitutional difficulties, and with the extensive control of dairy products
by the provinces. The Wheat Board was established, although until
the 1940s it was given only price support functions. In the area of
transportation, the Board of Railway Commissioners was replaced
by the Board of Transport Commissioners, which was given
expanded functions. The licensing of commercial vehicles was
expanded to include controls on entry for the "public necessity and
convenience", and licensing and price controls for the sale of
gasoline were established. In the market, the strains of the
depression produced restrictions on the common law remedies of
creditors and mortgagees, as well as restraints on prices, although
the federal legislation about prices was declared ultra vires. With
respect to labour, legislation about minimum wages and the number
of hours and the conditions of work was extended, although again
the federal legislation was declared ultra vires. More important,
provincial statutes gave government the power to impose uniform
wages and work hours throughout an entire industry after they had
been agreed upon by representatives of the employers and
employees. Finally, licensing was imposed on the emerging field of
radio broadcasting.
At the end of the 1930s, many of the major structures of our
regulatory state were established, although most of them became
more complex and powerful after World War II. The market and
13. See Corry, The Growth of Government Activities Since Confederation, supra,
note 2, and Baggaley, supra, note 2. See also McConnell, The JudicialReview of
Prime Minister Bennett's New Deal (1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L.J. 39, and
McConnell, Some Comparisonsof the Roosevelt and Bennett New Deals (1971), 9
Osgoode Hall L.J. 221.

Lawyers, Courts, and the Rise of the Regulatory State 41

individual responsibility were challenged and restricted much more
than they had been in any other single decade, and the very purposes
of regulation seemed to be changing: redistribution and planning
had become larger and more apparent objectives.
(a) Lawyers andAcademics in the 1930s
The legal literature, particularly the periodicals, are my only source
of the opinions of lawyers during the 1930s; whether other material,
especially unpublished material, can be found and whether it will
offer more information awaits research. Scattered comments about
regulation began to appear in the literature in the middle of the
1920s,' 4 and the topics and attitudes contained in it fairly quickly
became sharply divided between those of the practitioners and those
of the academics. In the late 1920s, the practitioners began to sound
warnings about regulation. At first, most of these warnings were a
dutiful reflection of controversy in England, especially books by
Lord Hewart and C.K. Allen and the report of the Donnomore
Committee. In 1934, the Chief Justice of Ontario, on his ninetieth
practice
birthday, protested against the "ever-increasing
of. . .depriving our people of the protection of the law and of the
Courts, by vesting in autocratic bodies the power to arbitrarily deal
with matters affecting our liberties and other rights without the
intervention of any court. . . .There are but two ways whereby the
people's rights can be determined: one is by the courts, the other by
the exercise of arbitrary power. . . .The national safety is in
danger. Let this invasion of the people's rights continue and the
ultimate result must be despotism, a Frankenstein; we will cease to
be a free people, and our condition will be like that of unhappy
Russia, not the England of old."' 5 And, in 1938, J.W. Farris
complained that, "Whatever menace there is today to the justice of
6
the Courts comes from Parliament." 1
14. See, for example, Chipman, Government by Commission (1911), 31 Can.
L.T. 446; RWS, Note (1925) 3 Can. Bar Rev. 97; Garrett, Concerningthe Revision
of the Statutes (1925), 3 Can. Bar Rev. 113; RWS, Workmen's Compensation
(1925) 3 Can. Bar Rev. 144: Brooks, Democracy and Legislation (1926), 4 Can.
Bar Rev. 562: Note (1927), 5 Can. Bar Rev. 782; Shannon, Bureaucracy and the
Courts (1930), 8 Can. Bar Rev. 77; and Winslow, Bureaucracy (1930), 8 Can. Bar
Rev. 278. See also O'Leary, How Far Have We Gone Socialist (1931), 38 Queens
Quar. 140.
15. Mulock, Address of the ChiefJustice of Ontario (1934), 12 Can. Bar Rev. 35.
16. Farris, Justice of the Courts (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 509.
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The most suggestive record of the practitioners' attitudes during
the 1930s is the annual reports of the Committee on Noteworthy
17
Changes in the Statute Law of the Canadian Bar Association.
Throughout the 1930s, these reports contained increasingly strident
and despairing warnings about "apparently irresistible" and
"relentless" developments. The major elements of these warnings
were the diminishing scope for private enterprise; the dangers of
extensive and vague grants of discretion to the government and to
agencies; the limitations on resort to the courts; and the threat that
regulation posed to freedom of contract - that is, to "the
fundamental and essential place of contract," - and to private
property, "the pillar on which our whole civilization rests". In
1938, the committee suggested that "the time may be approaching
when we will find that we cannot maintain a democracy and the rule
of law without something which at all events has the effect of a
written constitution." In 1939, doom must have seemed imminent.
The committee said that "unless we can govern ourselves according
to settled and generally recognized principles of right and wrong,
we are headed either for anarchy or despotism," and it could "find
no place in any civilized system of law" for some of the Alberta
legislation. These protests suggest that the initial response of
insulation was replaced by hostility. One cause may have been the
threat that regulation would limit the power of the lawyers and their
clients, but another was the threat that these changes made to the
foundation of ideals that had shaped their understanding of law and
their constitutional beliefs, as well as their perceptions of reality and
the justifications of their role.
The academics were a happy few. Led by J.A. Corry, W.P.M.
Kennedy, and John Willis, they wrote a distinctive set of articles in
the mid-and late 1930s.18 Five themes were common to most of
17. These reports are printed in the annual Proceedings of the Canadian Bar
Association: 1932 at 138; 1934 at 219; 1935 at 212; 1936 at 210; 1937 at 256; 1938
at 191; 1939 at 196; and 1940 at 120.
18. Corry, Administrative Law in Canada (1933), 5 Proc. Can. Pol. Sci. Assoc.
190; Kennedy, Aspects of Administrative Law in Canada [1934] Jur. Rev. 203;
Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law, the Judicial, the Conceptual, and
the Functional (1935), 1 U. Toronto L.J. 53; Finkelman, Separation of Powers: A
Study in Administrative Law (1936), 1 U. Toronto L.J. 313; Hopkins,
Administrative Justice in Canada (1939), 17 Can. Bar Rev. 619; Finkleman,
Government by Civil Servants (1939), 17 Can. Bar Rev. 166; and Humphrey,
JudicialControl over Administrative Action With Special Reference to the Province
of Quebec (1939), 5 Can. Econ. Pol. Sci. 417. Some examples of earlier scholarly
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their writing. The first was a realization that society and its law were
changing dramatically, and unlike the lawyers, most of the
academics were hopeful and even enthusiastic about the change.
The second theme was a conviction that change brought uncertainty
and a need for continual experimentation in designing the new
institutions. The-next was a deep scepticism about conceptual and
abstract thinking and about the traditional ideals about law. This
scepticism was accompanied by a determination to study what
administrators "really do" and by a belief that effective solutions to
problems would tend to be particular to each context. The fourth
theme was an awareness that the new powers brought with them the
challenge of controlling the bureaucracy, and an increasing conflict
between individual freedom and the state.
The fifth and last of these common themes was the legitimacy of
the delegation of powers and agencies. Here there was a jumble of
ideas. The two major ones were a faith in expertise and experience,
and a rejection of the attitudes and procedures of the courts. The
minor ideas were the promise of flexibility, which could permit
experimentation, and of a savings of cost and time. Most of these
ideas seem to have been derived from England, for example from
Carr's DelegatedLegislation. The most coherent and original of the
justifications was a "functional approach", announced by John
Willis: "The problem put is, how shall the powers of government
be divided up? The problem is neither one of law nor of formal
logic, but of expediency. The functional approach examines, first,
the existing functions of existing governmental bodies in order to
discover what kind of work each has in the past done best, and
assigns the new work to the body which experience has shown best
fitted to perform work of that type. If there is no such body, a new
writing are Tennant, Administrative Finality (1928), 4 Can. Bar Rev. 496 (which
was the product of graduate work at Harvard under Frankfurter and is the first

substantial discussion of judicial review in Canada), and reviews by Kennedy
(1928), 4 Can. Bar Rev. 563, and Smith (1932) 6 Can. Bar Rev. 611. Smith said
that, "In the rapidly narrowing field for doctoral theses, there might be found a law

student in one of our universities who might write an admirable dissertation on the
'Malign Influence of Dicey on the Mentality of the Legal Profession'." There was
little other scholarly writing that discussed these issues; see Brady, The State and
Economic Life in Canada (1933), 3 U. Toronto Q. 422; Grant, The Civil Service of
Canada (1934), 41 Queens Q. 256; Corry, The Fusion of Government and Business
(1936), 2 Can. J. Econ. Pol. Sci. 301; Dafoe, Public Utilities and Administrative
Boards (1936), 2 Can. J. Econ. Pol. Sci. 317; and Brady, The Ontario
Hydro-ElectricPower Commission (1936), 2 Can. J. Econ. Pol. Sci. 331.
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one is created ad hoc." Note the rejection of conceptual and
abstract thinking and the stress on particular contexts. Ultimately,
this approach depends upon having some conception of different
kinds of functions, and Willis' writing contains some traces of the
distinction between political and administrative functions.
This kind of thinking was a denial of the traditional ideals and the
distinction between law and politics. It paralleled much of the
writing of the realists in the United States, especially in its
scepticism about conceptual and abstract thinking, its rejection of
the courts, and its concern for facts and context, and it paralleled
trends in other disciplines, such as economics and history. It had
less effect than the realists, however, and again I can only make
suggestions for some explanations for the differences. First, there
was much less of this kind of writing in Canada and it was probably
a smaller proportion of all legal scholarship. Second, one of the
major targets of the realists was the distinctive effort to make legal
reasoning conceptual, and this effort had not been taken as far in
England and Canada. Finally, academics in Canada have, in
general, had less influence than their counterparts in the United
States.
John Willis has already been honoured during these celebrations.
I wish both to add to the honour and to give some evidence of why
the honour is due. During the 1930s and early 1940s, he wrote three
major pieces on the topic discussed in this paper: a book, The
Parliamentary Powers of Government Departments, and two
articles, "Three approaches to Administrative Law" and "Administrative Law and the British North America Act". He also
edited another book, Canadian Boards at Work, and wrote two
other major articles that bear on the topic, "Statutory Interpretation
in a Nutshell" and "Section 96".19 All of them were original
19. See The ParliamentaryPowers of Government Departments (1933); Canadian
Boards at Work (1941); Three Approaches to Administrative Law, supra, note 18;
The Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to Administrative Bodies
(1932), 18 Iowa L.R. 150; Statutory Interpretationin a Nutshell (1938), 16 Can.
Bar Rev. 1: Administrative Law and the British North America Act (1939) 53
Harvard L.R. 251. See also, Delegatus Non Potest Delegare (1943), 21 Can. Bar
Rev. 257; Section 96 of the British North America Act (1949), 18 Can. Bar Rev.
517; Administrative Law in Retrospect (1974), 24 U. Toronto L.J.; and The
McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values (1968), 18 U.
Toronto L.J. Willis' letters to the editor of the Canadian Bar Review are a

wonderful combination of grace, passion, and insight; see, for example, a letter
about executive privilege in (1943) Can. Bar Rev. 52 - "The lawyer seems to
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contributions, and were far better than anything that had been
written in England and were as good as the writing being done in the
United States. They are still provocative and valuable. He did not
propose comprehensive doctrine and programs for the future, but he
challenged us to do our own thinking for our own times. He
perceived the changes and the distinctive elements of the Canadian
experience rigorously and clearly. One example of a relatively
technical perception is his emphasis on the agencies as "governments in miniature," although he did not invent the phrase. He
unmasked pomp and myth with a wonderful combination of passion
and reason, and he was especially perceptive and eloquent about the
deep gulf between the lawyers' myths and proclaimed ideals, and
the reality of government - which the lawyers were making and
experiencing.
(b) The Courts in the 1930s
During the 1930s, the courts continued to decide only a few cases
involving regulation, and in general they continued to be willing to
respect administrative powers, probably more willing than the Privy
Council. 20 The doctrine became more specialized and complex,
and, in particular, the distinction between administrative and
judicial powers became important. Indeed, this distinction became
the dominant element of the doctrine in the 1930s. These two terms
- administrative and judicial - had been used before in England
and Canada, but they had usually not been the central element of the
have two sides to his mind, one of them taking note of what really happens in
government which he uses for everyday life, and the other unconsciously
disregarding the facts of modern government which he uses when he comes to talk
law" - and my favourite, a note and a letter about statutory interpretation, in
(1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 296 and 580.
20. Representative cases from Ontario and the Supreme Court from the 1930s and
1940s are: Re Ashby [1934] OR 421; Re Hayward [1934] OR 133; St. John v.
Fraser [1935] SCR 441; Harris v. Law Society of Alberta [1936] SCR 88; Re
Toronto and York [1936] OR 177, aff'd [1938] AC 415; Pioneer Landry [1938]
SCR 1, rev'd [1940] AC 127; Re Imperial Tobacco and McGregor [1939] OR 213,
aff'd [ 1939] OR 627; CanadianNational Railways and Bell Telephone [ 1939] SCR
309; R. v. Noxema Chemical [ 1942] SCR 181; Re FairfieldModern Dairy and Milk
Control Board of Ontario [1942] 579; Tolton Manufacturing v. Advisory
Committee for the Mens and Boys Clothing Industry for the Province of Ontario
[1942] OR 518 (CA), aff'd [1943] OR 526, aff'd [1944] SCR 349; Re Gray [1943]
OR 81; Re Brown and Brock and Rentals Administrator [1945] OR 554 (CA); Re
Ness and Canadian Racing Associations [1946] OR 54; Re Securities Act and
Morton [ 1946] OR 492; Re Securities Act and Gardiner [ 1948] OR 71; Re Imperial
Leaf Tobacco and Township of Mersea [1949] OR 665 (CA).
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reasoning, except in cases involving certiorari and section 96 of the
BNA Act; they had no settled meanings and were not consistently
opposed to each other.
In the late 1920s and early 19 30s, D.M. Gordon wrote four long
articles for the Law Quarterly Review. 2 1 It is some measure of the
attitude of English lawyers that these articles are all but a few of
those in the Review on regulation and administrative law, and it
may be a source of some pride that Gordon was a Canadian. These
articles were, however, different from the articles in the Canadian
journals. They were powerful and intense analyses of cases and
abstract concepts, such as jurisdiction, law, fact, and ministerial,
administrative, and judicial functions. Gordon's thinking about the
basic issues of the allocation of functions emerged only obliquely
through this analysis.
The best known of these articles were two about jurisdiction, and
especially the doctrine about preliminary and colateral facts. In
them, Gordon presented a powerful criticism of the doctrine, which
had virtually no effect. Two more of the articles, about courts and
agencies in general, are not really as well known, but they had a far
greater effect. In them, Gordon presented coherent and comprehensive definitions of the terms "judicial" and "administrative": a
judicial function was the determination of "pre-existing" rights and
liabilities through the application of "fixed objective standards"
and an administrative function was the creation of rights and
liabilities through "policy and expediency". "A judicial tribunal
looks for some law to guide it; an administrative tribunal, within its
province, is a law unto itself." ' 22 Again, the distinction, between
law and politics is apparent. In 1934 these definitions were adopted
wholeheartedly in Re Ashby, an Ontario case, and it soon became
dominant in Canada. In contrast, the English courts never
committed themselves so firmly to the importance of the distinction,
or to any definitions. Rarely have our courts' ways of thinking been
shaped so directly by a forgotten scribble. In the 1930s, the
distinction was used in cases involving section 96, the limits of
certiorari, and claims to procedural rights. However, in several of
the procedure cases, the courts included a less formal analysis and
21. Gordon, Certiorariand the Revival of Error in Fact (1926) 42 L.O.R. 521;
The Relations of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929) 45 L.O.R. 459; The Observance of
Law as a Condition of Jurisdiction (1931) 47 L.O.R. 386 and 557; and
Administrative Tribunalsand the Courts (1933) 49 L.O.R. 94 and 419.
22. Supra, note 20.
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stated clearly that the distinction was not crucial because some
rights would be available, even if a function was administrative.
VI. Patterns ofRegulation: 1950 to 1983
The years from 1950 to 1983 cannot easily be considered one period
or series of periods, since the timing of the trends that occurred in
the patterns of regulation and in the thinking of the courts and
lawyers differ substantially. During the war years, extensive
regulation of the economy was imposed, primarily through the War
Measures Act. 2 3 Most of this regulation was removed when peace
returned, but the experience, especially the exercise of regulatory
power and the impressive results it achieved, may have contributed
to the willingness to use and accept regulation. During the last few
years of the war and during a few years afterward, several
committees of the Canadian Bar Association protested again against
the expanding bureaucracy, but eventually these protests
disappeared. 24
From 1945 to 1980, there has been an immense increase in
regulation, both in the intensity of the administration of the existing
programs and in the creation of new powers. 25 The changes in
administration are suggested simply by the increases in budgets and
staff, but firm conclusions about the timing and extent of these
changes depend upon research that has not yet been done. The
creation of new powers seems to have occurred in two very roughly
defined periods. The first was from the end of World War II to the
mid-1950s and included the compulsory marketing of wheat
through the Wheat Board, collective bargaining requirements
(which were essentially a continuation by the provinces of federal
wartime requirements), municipal planning powers, and protections
23. See Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the MacKenzie King
Government, 1939-45 (1975).
24. Representative discussions and reports can be found in the annual Proceedings
of the CanadianBar Association: 1941 at 208 and 212; 1943 at 29, 78, 215, and
315; 1944 at 184; 1945 at 153 and 169; 1946 at 133; 1947 at 50, 143, and 147; 1948
at 166; 1950 at 27, 97, and 163; and 1951 at 42 and 77. See also Stewart, The
Abuse of Freedom (1942) 20 Can. Bar Rev. 649; Aikins, The War and After
(1943), 21 Can. Bar Rev. 521; Johnson, The Reign of Law Under an Expanding
Bureaucracy (1944), 22 Can. Bar Rev. 380; and Report of Committee on Civil
Liberties (1944), 22 Can. Bar Rev. 598.
25. For accounts of these changes, see Responsible Regulation: An Interim Report
by the Economic Council of Canada (1979), Ch. 2, and Stanbury and Thompson,
Regulatory Reform in Canada (1982).
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of human rights. The second period was from the late 1960s to the
mid-1970s and included regulation regarding occupational health
and safety, consumer protection, environmental protection, restrictions on foreign investment, rent control, the national energy
policy, and, for a few years, the control of wages and prices.
During this period, decisions were contested more often than they
had been previously, and there were many more hearings, which
became increasingly longer and more complex. Judicial decisions,
statutes, and administrative practice widened the scope of judicial
participation, although restrictions on standing and a lack of
adequate funds severely restricted participation in decisions that had
widely diffused effects, such as decisions about the environment.
Perhaps lawyers became more conspicuous and powerful participants in the regulatory process at this time not only through judicial
review, but through their roles as commissioners, counsel to
commissions, arbitrators, and advisors and strategists. Incorporation and conquest may have replaced hostility.
The regulation during this time differed from that of the past in at
least three ways, all of which are differences of degree, but
important nevertheless. First, agencies tended more often to be
given the powers to plan the general conduct of the industries they
regulated, rather than the powers to police only limited aspects,
such as entry or price. Second, the range of interests and effects to
be considered was expanded greatly. An example of this "social
regulation" is environmental control, and it can be contrasted to
much of the regulation of entry and prices. Of course, much of this
regulation has not been effective and has not achieved its "social"
purposes, and the allocation of costs and benefits may be a major
reason for this. Third, regulation tended more often to have
objectives that were avowedly noneconomic - for example, the
regulation of foreign investment and requirements for Canadian
content in broadcasting. Regulation in Canada has always had
noneconomic objectives, but they seem to have become more
26
significant during the past few decades.
In 1983, the result of this increase in regulation is obvious. We
live in an intensely regulated society. The interest in "deregulation" that appeared during the late 1970s seems to be waning, and
26. Some of these ideas are developed in Schultz, "The Development of
Regulation in Canada" (1980) Working Paper 1980-11, McGill Centre for
Regulated Industries.
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Early in the 1970s, a shift occurred and regulation again became a
topic for discussion. A long series of studies, reports, books, and
articles began to be produced, including studies by the Law Reform
Commission, the report of the Economic Council, and the Peterson
Report. The reasons for this shift are doubtless complex, but some
of the influences are probably the example of similar debates in the
United States, the impact of the accumulation of regulation during
the past two decades (especially the "social regulation"), the shift
of some governments to the right, and, in particular, a
"deregulation" movement that this shift produced. Much of this
discussion was about the basic issue - how much regulation should
we have - and it differed from the debate in the 1930s in one
significant way. In the 1930s, the debate was primarily about
political values and the clash between individual freedoms and the
power of the state. In the 1970s, by contrast, the debate was much
more about choices among costs and benefits, as well as economic
analysis of the effects of regulation. We seem to have become more
worldly - and resigned.
More interesting for my purposes is the fact that some of the
debate was about the structures and procedures for regulation. There
were two major topics. The first was political control of the
independent agencies. The general, and unquestioned, assumption
was that this form of control was desirable - or at least inevitable
- and the debate was essentially about how it should be achieved.
It was an attempt to make McLean's proposal work. Most observers
agreed that the appeal to the cabinet had substantial disadvantages,
and proposals were made for different ways of asserting the control
by both the legislature and the cabinet, for example, through
directives, policy statements, and clearer specifications of objectives in legislation. The other major topic was procedures,
especially the right to participate in regulatory decisions. The
discussion included the theoretical justifications for participation,
the choice of the appropriate procedures for different kinds of
decisions, and the most common topic, the need for state support for
funding for participation in decisions with widely diffused effects.
Doubtless, much of this discussion was a mask for debates about
regulation itself, but much of it was about the legitimacy of
administrative powers and it was our first sustained discussion of
legitimacy. The previous lack of discussion is remarkable and is
probably a reflection of our willingness to accept extensive
governing.
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the nature of post-industrial capitalism and our political traditions
suggests that this intense regulation is our fate for the future.
Whether the impact of regulation in Canada is greater or less than it
is in England or the United States is debatable and difficult to
determine. The differences, whatever they are, are probably not
great, and certainly there is a greater difference in the structure of
the regulation in these countries than there is in its impact. The
structures in England and in Canada differ relatively substantially,
especially because government ownership has been so extensive in
England and because so much of the regulation is done by
government departments and so much of the determination of
individual benefits is done by separate tribunals. Our structures bear
a greater resemblance to those in the United States because of the
extensive use of the independent agency in both countries, but the
differences make Canada distinctive: our agencies usually have
more discretion, they often regulate both private and publicly
owned corporations, and, most important, the government often has
some form of direct political control.
VII. Thinking About Regulation in the 1970s
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was little public debate about
regulation and little thinking was done on the subject by lawyers and
academics. Most of what was done by common law academics was
constrained by narrowing visions of scholarship and especially by a
preoccupation with the doctrine of judicial review and analysis of
cases. Civil law academics seem to have been less constrained.
Much of the cause of this narrowing vision may have been the
dominance of the ideals of the major law schools in the United
States, which now seem to me to have been less of a blessing than I
thought they were when I was a student in the 1950s. The McRuer
Report, 2 7 which appeared in the late 1960s, made some proposals
for modest changes affecting regulation, primarily by establishing
rights to participate and procedures for seeking remedies for judicial
review. It also proclaimed the late nineteenth century ideals
eloquently, especially a faith in abstract generalizations, in courts,
and in individual rights. One of the marks of the narrow visions of
scholarship was that only one academic, John Willis, commented
28
on it at the level of constitutional principle.
27. Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report 1, Volume 1 (1968).
28. Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values,
supra, note 19.
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VIII. The Courts: 1950 to 1980
During the 1950s and 1960s, the volume of cases involving review
of regulatory powers increased greatly. My impression is that the
courts were certainly no more willing to respect regulatory powers
than they had been in the past, and some were especially hostile to
certain agencies, especially labour boards. I am, however, more
interested in their ways of thinking (although I realize that ways of
thinking are related to attitudes). The basic structure and the
dominant form of the reasoning continued to be the expression of
the late nineteenth century ideals. The doctrine was composed of
abstract general rules, which were to be applied by the courts in a
neutral and apolitical way, and their application was in itself a
justification of the results. The doctrine became more specialized,
and the prerogative writs, especially certiorari, became the primary
remedies for its elaboration, although appeals remained more
common. All of the complexities of the current doctrine finally
emerged. Formal analysis was able to find them implicit in the
earlier doctrine, but they had not dominated reasoning the way they
did during this period. Jurisdiction, which had been the central
principle and usually had simply denoted authority, became even
more abstract and was defined in complex ways. The mysterious
and wonderful concept of the preliminary or collateral matters upon
which jurisdiction might depend was manufactured out of some
general propositions in old English cases, primarily for use in labour
cases. The use of certiorari to review errors of law within
jurisdiction was revived, and the distinction between administrative
and judicial functions became more abstract and crucial to
procedural rights.
The doctrine tended to produce mutually exclusive categories:
issues were either law or fact and functions were either judicial or
administrative. The edge of jurisdiction was a sharp line; an agency
either had jurisdiction or lost it, as though it were a football to be
fumbled. More generally, functions tended to be divided between
those that would be reviewed and made to resemble courts and those
that were free from review and were presumably a wilderness of
discretion and arbitrariness. Again, the distinction between law and
politics appears in a different form. These distinctions often made
little functional sense and often obscured crucial issues about the
rationality and fairness of the exercise of power. For example, the
distinction between administrative and judicial powers may have
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contained a simple and useful consideration, but, elevated to a
monolithic and exclusive litmus, it obscured other considerations
and had no justification at all as a limitation on remedies.
The record of the Supreme Court's experience with this doctrine
in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s is disappointing, if not
lamentable. 29 The results often failed to express any intelligible
pattern or attitude toward review. The reasoning often failed to
explain the results in any way other than by invoking the abstract
doctrine, and it failed to discuss other recent decisions that seemed
relevant and perhaps inconsistent. The court demonstrated no
sustained effort to create any consistent attitude toward review. It
seemed content with the doctrine, even with the distinction between
administrative and judicial functions, and with its role, and it made
no significant effort to assess or change the doctrine.
In the late 1970s changes began to occur in the form of the court's
reasoning. Two decisions were dominant. In Nicholson, 30 the court
announced the "fairness" doctrine: in claims to participate, the
distinction between judicial and administrative functions would no
longer be crucial, and in several other decisions it sought to mitigate
the difficulties of distinction. In CUPE,31 it held that review for
jurisdictional review, especially statutory interpretation, would
include consideration of the rationality of the decision, rather than
be limited to the barren question of whether the issue was
preliminary (or collateral) or within or beyond some sharp line of
jurisdiction. In other cases, the court showed considerable respect
for the judgment of agencies in administering their own affairs.
The great expansion of government during the preceding three
decades may have been a stimulating context for this change. A
more particular stimulus may have been the ferment and change in
the English courts, especially in cases about rights to participate,
although a similar expansion of procedural rights in the United

29. The work of the court is discussed in Weiler, In the Last Report (1974), Ch. 5,
and in Hogg, The Supreme Court of Canadaand Administrative Law, 1949-1971
(1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J. 187. Some characteristic examples of this period are
Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission [ 1971] SCR 756; Calgary Power and
Halmrast v. Copithorne [1959] SCR 24; and R. v. Labour Relations Board of
Ontario;Ex parte MetropolitanLife Insurance [ 1970] SCR 425.
30. Re Nicholson and Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of
Police [1979] SCR 11.
31. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor
Corporation[1979] SCR 227.
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States may suggest the influence of some more pervasive change in
attitudes toward government.
The significance of these changes is not yet clear, except for the
expansion of the rights to participate. Doctrine does not determine
results and merely changing its terms cannot change results, but the
changes hold out some hope for an escape from abstract, monolithic
distinctions. Unfortunately, some other decisions of the court have
obscured this hope. In some decisions it has failed to give adequate
reasons (for example, the thoughtful judgment in CUPE lies in
contrast to the lack of explanation in some other judgments) and in
others it has failed to respond to obvious and important issues. In
addition, the court has occasionally seemed inconsistent, especially
in dealing with the implications of CUPE and in its attitudes toward
32
the distinction between functions.
IX. Conclusion
I began by describing the ideals of lawyers in the late nineteenth
century. These ideals have been fundamentally challenged in the
twentieth century by both reality and scholarship. The reality was
the changes in the social context, especially the emergence of
regulation and the welfare state and the increasing diversity and
complexity. The most dramatic challenge of scholarship came from
the realists in the United States, especially through their attacks on
conceptual and abstract thinking and on the distinction between law
and politics. The ideals still shape much of our doctrine and the
form of our thinking, but the gap between them and the reality of
government is great and much of our faith has become only habit
and ritual. The ideals have failed us - or we have failed them.
During the past decade, legal scholarship has' been in turmoil,
especially in the United States. Much of this turmoil can be seen as
responses to these challenges, and the struggle is crucial because the
ultimate stake is a legal theory for a liberal society (although again I
wonder whether the differences in political traditions should make
the issues different in Canada than they are in the United States).
The Charter will not save us this effort, because the issue is how to
think about the Charter.

32. The recent work of the court is discussed in a series of articles by Mullan in
The Supreme Court Review, entitled Developments in Administrative Law...

(1980), 1 at 1; (1980), 2 at 1; (1982), 3 at 1; and (1983), 5 at 1.
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The struggle is about the entire legal system and not just the topic
of this paper, regulation. But regulation does present distinctive
problems, especially with the individual and the state. Two
examples of such problems are interpretation and the rule of the
law. Usually, review of regulatory powers for error of law or
jurisdiction is ultimately an issue of interpretation. We still often
profess to believe that a statute is a text that contains a discrete
meaning which can be found by an objective and detached reader,
perhaps with the help of some vague reference to social policy or the
intent of the legislature. The 1930s shattered the foundations of this
33
belief, and we still seek a secure replacement.
The fate of the rule of law is a more general problem and a crucial
one, because it is at the heart of our legal system. Lawyers have
been preoccupied by Dicey's formulation of the rule and especially
by its peculiarities and inaccuracies. This preoccupation is
inadequate, however, because it fails to grapple with the central
question of whether the ideal - laws that are general, prospective,
and govern individuals and the state indifferently - is coherent,
just, and attainable. The ideal has caused much harm; for example,
it has legitimated much abuse of private power. But it can be a
valuable ideal for controlling public power. Our regulatory state
gives immense discretion to officials; whatever we may believe or
hope, the lawyers in the 1930s were correct: the rule of law in the
form in which they knew it was passing. Our problem is whether it
34
can be reformulated in a complex and intensely regulated society.

33. The literature is vast and some of the most recent writing is among the most
provocative; see, for example, a symposium entitled Law and Literature, in
(1982), Texas L.R. 373-586. See also Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation(1982)
34 Stanford L.R. 739; and Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critiqueof
Interpretivismand NeutralPrinciples(1983), 96 Harvard L.R. 781.

34. Again, the literature is vast. Some of the major items and examples are Dicey,
The Law of the Constitution (1885), Ch. 4; Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty
(1960), Pt. 2: Raz, The Authority of Law (1979), Ch. 11; Thompson, Whigs and
Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (1975); and Horwitz, Review 86 Yale LA.
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